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In this paper, we review the literature on circuit breakers
and examine whether they may be helpful in protecting the
capital and confidence of investors, in the era of increased
order fragmentation and increased automated trading. We start
with examining the literature on circuit breakers and then
move on to discussing automated trading with a focus on the
Flash Crash of 2010.
Circuit breakers are usually triggered when prices cross
certain pre-established boundaries and cause markets to halt
trading for a pre-determined period of time. Such halts allow a
cessation of trade before a significant trade imbalance or an
important news announcement. Price limits on derivatives
markets disallow trade at prices outside of established
boundaries, though trade within those boundaries may
continue to take place. While price limits date back several
decades, circuit breakers are a comparatively new
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2013.10.003Circuit breakers came into prominent focus after the
market crash on October 19, 1987, when the US market
dropped by more than 20%, and again during the Flash Crash
of 2010 (discussed later). The general notion is that rapidly
falling prices may exacerbate panic amongst investors and
cause limit orders to become unfairly stale. Circuit breakers
that allow a cool-down period and a batching of trades can
mitigate this problem. Another reason for breakers is that
extreme order imbalances during rapid market movements
might result in prices that are clearly at odds with funda-
mentals. Letting orders accumulate and then batching them
may lead to better quality execution prices and thus lower
volatility. Finally, circuit breakers may preclude trade at pri-
ces that occur in response to automated execution of erro-
neous order (e.g., those typed in with an extra and erroneous
“zero” at the end).
Currently, the NYSE circuit breaker levels are as follows.
Circuit-breaker levels are set every quarter as Level 1 (10%),
Level 2 (20%), and Level 3 (30%) where the percentages are
relative to the closing values of Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) in the last month of the previous quarter. The
halt for a 10% decline in DJIA is one hour if it occurs before
2 p.m., for 30 min between 2 and 2:30, but no halts after
2:30. The halt for a 20% decline is two hours if before
1 p.m., and one hour between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., and market
closure for the rest of the day after 2 p.m. If the market
declines by 30%, trading does not occur for the remainder of
the day.ting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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The “Flash Crash” and concerns about automated trading
renewed interest in circuit breakers. In the modern era, large
institutional orders are often programmed to execute algo-
rithmically and automatically across markets as well as across
time. Algorithms are also used to seek out misaligned prices
across multiple markets. Such algorithmic trading is thought to
account for 70% of US equity volume (Zhang, 2010 and en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmic_trading).
Algorithms may improve liquidity if they act as de facto
market makers. On the other hand if they create extra imbal-
ance (e.g., by place large orders to exploit pricing discrep-
ancies), they can hurt liquidity. Therefore, whether algorithmic
trading is beneficial remains an empirical issue. Hendershott,
Jones, and Menkveld (2011) show that when algorithmic ac-
tivity increases, liquidity increases as well. In recent years
(after 2003), the positive impact of algorithmic trading proxies
on liquidity has increased. There is other evidence that in the
algorithmic trading regime with much higher levels of volume,
market quality has actually increased. For example, Chordia,
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) show that intraday vola-
tility has declined on the NYSE during recent years. It is also
shown using an analysis of hourly to daily variance ratios that
prices are closer to the efficient market benchmark of a
random walk in recent years.
Dramatic improvements in technology have allowed com-
puter algorithms to speedily discern (possibly short-lived)
profit opportunities over units of time as small as microsec-
onds and determine optimal order submission strategies. Such
very short-term algorithmic trading is often termed “high
frequency trading” (HFT). HFT programs often monitor prices
and liquidity across different markets and choose order sub-
mission strategies to efficiently execute orders at the lowest
cost. A second impetus for this study is the fact that HFT
strategies are agnostic to a stock’s price level and have no
intrinsic interest in the fate of companies, leaving little room
for a firm’s fundamentals to play a direct role in its trading
strategies.
The evidence on the impact of HFT on financial markets is
mixed. Thus, Menkveld (2010) argues that HFT trades are
mostly passive, in that their price quotes are “hit upon” by the
market 80% of the time, suggesting that HFT traders act as de
facto market makers. In this sense they provide liquidity to the
market. Hendershott and Riordan (2011) argue that HFT
traders trade to remove transitory pricing errors, i.e., price
changes that reverse after a short period of time.
Brogaard (2010) finds that HFT not only trade to remove
pricing errors, but also add to the “price discovery” process,
i.e., their trades incorporate permanent information into stock
prices. However, Zhang (2010) finds that HFT trading causes
price overreaction and reversals, and also is associated with
slightly higher volatility. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2010)
argue that faster computerized trading exposes human
traders to “adverse selection.” Specifically, since computers
can react faster to news, they can submit or cancel orders
faster than investors, leaving humans exposed to adverse pricemoves. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009)
find that HFT trades are more cross-correlated than human
trades, suggesting that HFT trading may contribute to market
instability.
High-frequency trading has order cancellation rates in the
region of 90% and Madhavan (2012) argues that these stra-
tegies are not well understood. For example, some high-
frequency traders use quote stuffing, characterized by unex-
pected increases in quote frequency without any significant
information releases. The idea is to spam an exchange with a
lot of quotes in a short span of time creating a false illusion
that there is interest in a stock when there is none, and
canceling such quotes later. An arbitrage opportunity is
created if exchanges become overwhelmed with such orders
and lag other exchanges, and traders are tricked into submit-
ting orders on the belief that is indeed an interest in a stock.
Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2011) investigate this
practice and conclude that stocks become more illiquid and
volatile during such periods. Hasbrouck and Saar (2010)
examine low-latency strategies, i.e., those strategies that
trade in units of milliseconds. They explore submitted,
executed, and canceled orders likely part of an HFT program.
They argue that low latency HFT activity improves market
quality measures such as liquidity and volatility.
Overall, approximately as many studies find that HFT is
harmful to markets as find that it is beneficial. It is therefore
difficult to conclude one way or the other whether HFT trading
should be regulated or controlled from a policy perspective.
3. The “Flash Crash”
On May 6, 2010, U.S. stock markets and associated de-
rivatives lost more than 5 percent, and recovered most of it in
less than an hour. This “Flash Crash” was a momentous event
in the stock market (like the October 1987 crash) that attracted
the interest of many policymakers and regulators. A survey
conducted by ishares/Blackrock (http://www.cftc.gov/About/
CFTCCommittees/CFTC.../cftcsecac_archardstudy.pdf) found
that 46% of investors believed that HFT was the biggest cause
of the Flash Crash. Kirilenko, Samadi, Kyle, and Tuzun (2011)
find, however, that HFT trader inventories remained rather
small throughout the Flash Crash, suggesting that HFT traders
did not cause the crash. Specifically, the Flash Crash was
triggered by a 75,000 contract sell program, and net holdings
of the HFTs were so modest that HFTs could not have caused
volatility on the day of the flash crash. Madhavan (2012) finds
that strong evidence that securities that experienced greater
prior fragmentation of orders across multiple exchanges were
disproportionately affected on May 6, 2010. He suggests that
when markets are fragmented, prices are more sensitive to
liquidity shocks because fragmentation leads to each venue’s
limit order book being thinner than in a consolidated market
setting.
The Flash Crash affected many investors, primarily because
exchanges canceled trades at prices below 60% of the
2:40 p.m. ET price, but many investors whose execution prices
did not meet the 60% threshold lost considerable wealth. In
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investor confidence.
In general, markets become fragile when significant im-
balances arise because of very large anomalous orders. Such
orders may be larger than what market makers are willing to
hold, and this may cause a crash because no-one may willing
to take the other side without a significant price drop. As
markets become more institutionalized and automated, regu-
lation may be required. Thus, since the flash crash, there have
been moves to regulate HFT. Indeed, there has been some talk
about having algorithms vetted by regulators (http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/28130ab2-650c-11e0-9369-00144feab49a.html).
However, such efforts may be misplaced because, as we have
seen, the evidence is not conclusive on whether HFT helps or
hurts markets.
The flash crash has also resulted in the imposition of stock-
specific circuit breakers. For example, under recent rules,
trading in the larger stocks would pause for a five-minute
period in the event that the stock experiences a 10 percent
change in price over the preceding five minutes. The trigger is
larger for small caps not in the Russell 2000: it is 30% for
stocks with a previous-day closing price of $1 or more, and
50% for penny stocks. The avowed objective again is to pro-
mote market confidence by allowing market participants time
to assimilate information and mobilize liquidity during periods
of sharp and potentially destabilizing price swings. The NYSE
also has introduced liquidity replenishment points (LRP) that
preclude automatic execution beyond a lower trigger, typically
2e4% price movements. It is too early to tell whether these
impediments have hurt or helped the US stock markets.
4. The evidence on circuit breakers
We will now review the theory and evidence on the efficacy
and impact of circuit breakers. Importantly, circuit breakers
may affect prices even if they are not triggered. But, since they
are triggered so rarely, at the present moment, it is challenging
to ascertain their costs or benefits with any degree of reli-
ability. Any discussion of potential benefits has to be based on
logic, rather than evidence.
We first review theoretical arguments on breakers.
Greenwald and Stein (1991) and Kodres and O’Brien (1994)
argue that when noise traders continuously move prices
away from fundamentals, more sophisticated traders refrain
from trading because prices are noisy. Circuit breakers allow
the batching of orders and improving liquidity. A breaker may
also decrease volatility because it allows for more time for
traders to react. Thus, in sharply falling markets traders may
receive margin calls. Without a halt traders may be caught by
surprise and may not be able to satisfy their margin calls. This,
in turn, may cause brokers to suspect an impending default and
sell securities to raise cash. Such orders may lead to further
selling which may exacerbate the price decline. A halt that
collects and matches orders after trading resumes may allow
for more time for margin calls to be fulfilled. This may allow
for restored confidence reduced order imbalances, thereby
improving liquidity.In terms of costs, a circuit breaker may affect decisions of
investors prior to the triggering of the breaker. Subrahmanyam
(1994) demonstrates the “magnet effect.” Thus, as the price
nears the limit, investors anxious about being denied the op-
portunity to trade will advance their trades in time, thus
increasing price volatility. Subrahmanyam (1997) argues that
informed agents also might be concerned that their large trades
might trigger the breaker. In this case, they would simply
reduce their order sizes which would increase the bid-ask
spread for small orders. This might end up harming retail in-
vestors, who typically submit smaller orders than large
institutions.
In terms of empirical evidence, Goldstein and Kavajecz
(2004) consider an episode on October 27, 1997, when cir-
cuit breakers were triggered. They find that circuit breakers
cause a reduction in liquidity on the day following the circuit
breaker, because limit order traders do not wish to resubmit
previous days’ expired orders. This causes a lack of depth in
the limit order book. This evidence does not support the notion
that circuit breakers calm down markets and increase market
liquidity. Likely this happens because market participants are
still recovering on the next day from a complete inability to
trade, which is a psychologically significant event.
Since circuit breakers are rarely triggered, experimental
studies are one way to investigate likely impacts of these
impediments to trade. Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001a)
conduct such an experiment to focus on the effects of NYSE-
type market-wide breakers. They find that circuit breakers
cause agents to speed up their trading activity as the price
approaches a trigger, supporting a magnet effect. It also is
likely that an impending circuit breaker in one market might
cause volume to migrate away to another market, an issue that
has not yet been tested in an experimental setting. More
studies are needed on the magnet effect as well as the effect of
breakers on satellite markets. Following their previous study,
Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001b) examine circuit
breakers when agents are uncertain about the presence of
private information. They find that circuit breakers perform no
useful function in experimental asset markets. During a tem-
porary halt, the price moves away from fundamental value in
periods without private information (which it should not in a
rational market), possibly because agents may be more likely
to mistakenly infer that others possess private information.
Temporary halt provides traders time for focusing on irrele-
vant information, as opposed to promoting rational thought.
Kuhn, Kuserk, and Locke (1991) consider cash and futures
markets on October 13, 1989, when circuit breakers were
triggered. They are not able to find evidence that circuit
breakers reduced volatility in either market on the day after the
triggering of the breaker. Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993)
consider order flow data from the Tel-Aviv Exchange during
the crash of 1987, when the exchange imposed a closure due to
extreme order imbalance. They find that the closure smoothes
price fluctuations around the crash but has no long-run impact
on the price drop. The evidence supports the notion that long-
run price behavior would be unaltered with or without the
presence of the breaker.
7A. Subrahmanyam / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 4e9Santoni and Liu (1993) perform a rare study to directly
determine how coordinated circuit breakers adopted by the
NYSE, CME, and other derivatives exchanges affect day-to-
day volatility. They test for changes in volatility following
the adoption of circuit breakers using an autoregressive con-
ditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model. Using data from
the inception of the breakers after the October 1987 crash to
1991, they find that breakers have had no significant effects on
volatility.
Gerety and Mulherin (1992) investigate how the daily
opening and closing of financial markets affects trading vol-
ume. They find that closing volume is related to expected
price moves overnight and opening volume is positively
related to overnight volatility. This indicates that circuit
breakers may block the investors’ desire to shed risk to others.
The difference between a regular and a circuit breaker closure
makes it difficult to generalize this finding. Thus, a circuit
breaker closure is associated with large market movements
and high volatility (when agents would probably be wary of
trading even if the market is open), but a regular closing is
not.5. Circuit breakers and the Flash Crash
In sum, the bulk of the literature has not found solid evi-
dence that circuit breakers reduce or increase volatility. Thus,
it is not possible to state with certainty whether breakers hurt
or harm financial markets, because they are rarely triggered.
As pointed out in the previous section, the main drawback
of circuit breakers are possible “magnet effects” and the
inability of investors to realize their trading needs in a timely
manner (after the breaker has been triggered). It is, however,
hard to believe that these costs of circuit breakers are material
when a completely unexpected algorithm moves markets by a
large amount like in the Flash Crash. Such an algorithm is
unlikely to cause a magnet effect precisely because it is un-
predictable (recall magnet effects are caused when investors
accelerate their trading in response to an anticipated triggering
of the breaker). In addition, the consideration during the Flash
Crash was a temporary and unexpected slide in the market at
prices completely at odds with fundamental values and in this
situation the objective is to prevent trade at these prices not
facilitate trades.
Further, as we already have observed, during the Flash
Crash prices fell so quickly that exchange officials had to
cancel already-executed orders. This type of phenomenon
seriously threatens investor confidence. One does not, as an
investor, expect that an already executed order will be nullified
the next day. A circuit breaker has the distinct advantage of
preventing such order cancellations because when the market
is closed due to the breaker being triggered, no order can
execute.
Finally, when prices fall, Avery and Zemsky (1998) argue
that traders may condition their trades only on past sell orders
and sell even if their own information tells them to buy.
This may exacerbate a market crash. By interrupting asequence of sell orders, a circuit breaker can also prevent this
phenomenon.
Given the experience with the crash there is a compelling
case to be made for circuit breakers that would act as a
calming influence on the market and build investor confidence.
This point is also made by Kirilenko et al. (2011) who argue
that “appropriate safeguards must be implemented to keep
pace with trading practices enabled by advances in technol-
ogy.” There are, however, a few issues to be resolved before
circuit breakers are imposed to prevent Flash Crashes and
similar sudden price moves.
First, with deeply fragmentedmarkets and inter-related assets,
it is a challenge to make circuit breakers in the modern era suc-
cessful. For example, if a breaker is triggered in a primary ex-
change, thevolume is sure tomigrate off-exchange, specifically, in
the case of institutional volume, to a dark pool where institutions
can directly cross orders. Indeed, dark pools are increasing in
popularity and onewas recently introduced in Switzerland (http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/swiss-exchange-launches-dark-
pool-venture-2011-07-08). Zhu (2012) indicates that dark pools
handled about 12% of total order flow in the US during 2011.
Patterson (2010) states that inDecember 2010, theNYSEhandled
only 37% of the total equity volume. In Europe Chi-X, NYSE
Euronext, and other exchanges all attract a considerable fraction
of volume. Specifically, the primary regulated exchanges handle
only about 60% of volume for the Stoxx Europe 600 index
(Fioravanti & Gentile, 2011).
Because of fragmentation it is imperative that breakers be
coordinated. If not, a disruptive algorithm will simply search
for execution at avenues other than the closed exchange,
moving disruption elsewhere. Indeed, one issue the Flash Crash
raised was precisely that of coordinating circuit breakers. In the
flash crash, the derivatives exchange (CME) hit circuit breakers
but NYSE did not. This meant that CME derivatives halted
trading, but cash products at NYSE did not. This paradoxically
led to situations where equity orders were executed and got
canceled whereas derivatives hedges did execute when markets
opened after the breaker. Thus investors lost money on the
hedges (Madhavan, 2012). Had the breakers been applied to
both exchanges, this phenomenon would not have taken place.
Overall, the preceding arguments strongly indicate that clo-
sures should be coordinated across markets to preclude the
possibility of disruptive trading moving to other markets.
The final issue has to do with trigger points. Investors
obviously would prefer to have a continuous market to realize
their trading needs. Thus the triggers for circuit breakers
should be set wide enough to not interfere with the trading
process. A price triggered breaker should be used only during
periods of extreme market stress due to extreme order im-
balances. Also, different markets have different index levels
and different degrees of volatility. A price trigger therefore,
should be based on percentage, rather than point moves to
allow for comparable triggers across markets. While the
breaker, once applied, should be coordinated, if different
markets have extremely varying levels of volatility, the trigger
may also be based on volatility levels on each individual
market.
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Since circuit breakers are designed to apply to financial
markets, it is worth reviewing what roles financial markets
serve in society. First, prices in financial markets serve as
(imperfect) signals about the health of companies and the
overall economy. A rising price/market index signals a healthy
stock/economy and vice versa. Second, financial markets serve
as arenas where people can choose an appropriate risk appe-
tite. If they want to take on more risk in the expectation of a
higher return, they would use stocks as an appropriate in-
vestment vehicle. Circuit breakers impede these roles by
interrupting the continuous availability of market prices and
by precluding investment trades. Because they are an impo-
sition on the financial system, they should be used with
caution.
The problem is compounded by the fact that little evidence
in the literature that these benefits of breakers actually tran-
spire. Specifically, for example, there is no evidence that
breakers reduce volatility after trade recommences, and no
evidence that they reduce panic-driven selling. In fact, there is
some evidence in an experimental setting that breakers
encourage magnet effects, wherein subjects advance their
trading before the breaker bounds are crossed. Further, the
situations that any proposed breakers might be designed to
address (like the Flash Crash) are episodic in nature.
Algorithmic trading is often viewed as a threat to the sta-
bility of financial markets. The evidence on this issue is
mixed. Some studies find that automated algorithmic trading
has improved pricing efficiency and liquidity but at least one
study finds that it has increased volatility. The mixed evidence
does not provide a strong case for circuit breakers. There also
is a concern that algorithms can be designed to counteract
circuit breakers. For example, orders can be split up to ensure
that price changes occur slowly and breaker bounds are not
tripped.
The balance of the evidence suggests one cautious case for
breakers, namely, to counteract overly disruptive and possibly
erroneous trades. Thus, the Flash Crash resulted from a single
large order which seemed to momentarily have panicked the
market. A 10% decline and almost full recovery in an hour is
clearly not healthy for financial markets and not even for
regulators either. Many legitimately orders executed orders
were canceled the next day, taking investors by surprise and
such cancellations would not happen in a regime with a
breaker in place. Not that episodes like the Flash Crash cannot
be ruled out in increasingly high-frequency trading environ-
ments where human errors in submitting as well as interpret-
ing new orders have become more likely.
If it is deemed that impediments to trade are necessary to
combat clearly anomalous price moves, the question is what
type of breakers are the best way to go about the design. First,
the trigger bounds should be wide enough that the normal
functioning of financial markets is not impeded. Second, given
the considerable levels of fragmentation in financial markets,
one should use coordinated halts that are triggered using
percentage movements on more than one exchange. This isimperative also because of algorithmic trades that
involve “sweep orders” which scan all exchanges for the best
available execution price. The preclusion of trade in one
market could automatically allow search in substitute markets.
An erroneous order could then have a disruptive effect in
those markets which eventually would spill over to the pri-
mary market (possibly causing a longer closure). Thus, co-
ordinated halts would preclude halts being triggered on an
anomalous trade on a single exchange, and also prevent pre-
clude traders from migrating other exchanges and disrupting
trade at alternative venues. Finally, different markets use
different point systems to compute indices. Triggers should be
based on percentage, rather than point moves to ensure
consistency.References
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